RINP // CYBERSECURITY SERVICES
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We explain, in a shared language, the cybersecurity concepts used across Red in Pulse services, technical reports, and executive summaries. The definitions make the scope and output of offensive security work clear from the client's perspective, and they also show the distinctions between commonly confused terms.
Canonical definitions of commonly confused concepts
Abuse path
A genuinely exploitable behavior sequence in the runtime chain of a generative-AI application: indirect prompt injection, RAG disclosure, tool abuse, MCP authorization abuse, multi-turn chained exploitation. Not a theoretical vulnerability list; it is proven with a safe proof of concept under controlled execution.
attack path - the Modular Red Team Simulation goes to the critical target; this chain tests the AI application’s behavior.
AI-assisted offensive workflow
The use of human-supervised AI by the penetration-test and Red Team team across discovery, hypothesis, evidence handling, reporting and re-test flows. It is the backbone of the AI for Pentest & Red Team service. Not an external customer test, but an internal efficiency leverage. Not a fully autonomous attack agent, but a workflow operating on the ground of an approval model and a controlled pilot.
The Generative AI Red Team is the customer product being tested; this service is the internal workflow being improved. They are not the same.
Anonymized case
A case-narrative form in which a real customer engagement is de-identified while its structure, evidence-object type and decision impact are preserved. Anonymized ≠ fabricated; nothing is guessed from scratch. The sector category is named generically and numeric data is converted to qualitative phrasing.
“success story” - Red in Pulse cases are decision-clarity stories, not success or dramatic-threat narratives.
Approval model
Who approves each step of an AI-assisted workflow, at which authority level and with which acceptance logic; the written structure of use scenario, rules of engagement, artefact access, action level, proof-of-concept acceptance and pilot acceptance gates. The workflow is not run without an approval model.
AI for Pentest & Red Team.
Assumed breach
A scenario that begins with the assumption that the attacker has reached the internal network or an identity, and from there validates lateral movement and the impact chain toward the critical target. The third module of the Modular Red Team Simulation (RT-3) works with this logic. The initial-access stage is not hours of effort, but a hypothesis.
Attack path
The path to the critical target along the threat-actor, critical-asset or assumed-breach axis, under controlled execution, reduced to an evidence package with technical traces, a timeline and reproducible steps. It is the primary evidence object of the Modular Red Team Simulation. It is not the same as a vulnerability chain or kill chain.
chainable access flaw - the Network Security Penetration Test looks at the exposure chain; the attack path goes all the way to critical-target impact.
Attestation (evidence claim)
Signing and verifying build/CI pipeline outputs (model artefact, data-provenance chain, dependencies) and recording evidence claims in a structured form. The release decision (promote/rollback) is tied to this evidence ground. Sigstore, Cosign and in-toto are established forms of this chain.
AI Model Supply-Chain Assurance.
Audit-ready evidence package
A package that can be presented defensibly before management, an auditor or a regulator, carrying the technical-validation summary, control mapping, executive summary, prioritized remediation plan and closure evidence together. It is not the same as portable assurance for a customer security review; it is a separate assurance line.
Blast radius
The total area of impact reachable from a single starting position. What sets a finding's priority is often not the finding itself but how far one can travel from it.
BOLA / BFLA
Two core authorization flaws in API security. BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization) is a horizontal authority violation: accessing another same-level user’s object. BFLA (Broken Function Level Authorization) is a vertical authority violation: invoking an administrative function that should be unreachable. Both sit in the top three of the OWASP API Security Top 10.
Application Security Penetration Test (API scope).
Canary evidence
A traceable, harmless object placed into an environment on purpose to show that a control is actually enforced. It proves the control's decision was applied rather than merely present, and is removed from the environment when the test ends.
Chain-breaking control
A set of control proposals showing, in an owned and ordered way, which control breaks which step on the attack path, reduced to a fix-verify work list. Not individual “patch suggestions”; a structural control decision that breaks the chain of the attack path. It is the execution leg of the Modular Red Team Simulation report.
Client security review
A security posture assessment (vendor security assessment) an organization undergoes from its customers when evaluated as a solution partner or supplier. Question pools such as SIG, CAIQ and VSAQ are common forms. It is the trigger of the portable-assurance line.
S4-A portable assurance + the Customer Security-Review FAQ.
Component list (BOM / AI-ML-BOM)
A verifiable component list for model artefacts, data sources, dependencies and build outputs. Called SBOM for traditional software and AI-ML-BOM in the AI context. CycloneDX and SPDX are structured record forms of this list; it is an evidence object, not an inventory.
AI Model Supply-Chain Assurance.
Conditional Access
A policy layer that, after authentication, allows access or demands further verification based on device, location, application and risk signals. Clients or flows the policy does not cover can proceed without ever engaging it.
Continuous Penetration Testing
An offensive assurance program of at least three months, managed with planned monthly validation sprints and a fix-verify cycle. It is not a one-off test; nor is it unlimited testing - a planned rhythm within package limits. Measurable closure and monthly management visibility form the backbone.
The Application Security Penetration Test (PT-1) is one-off deep validation; Continuous Penetration Testing is not its “continuous version”.
Controlled testing
No attack simulation is performed without written authority, explicit scope, Rules of Engagement (RoE), a test window, approval gates, human oversight, side-effect control and an escalation line being visible. This is the ground on which Red in Pulse produces defensible assurance; it is not substituted by soft phrases like “ethical hacking” or “safe testing”.
Cookie tossing and shadowing
Setting a domain-wide cookie from a controlled subdomain to overwrite the application's own value (fixation) or to have a second cookie with the same name delivered alongside it (shadowing). The parser on the server side decides which value wins by its own rule.
Crown jewel (critical target)
A critical data asset, privileged identity or business-process component tied to the organization’s business objective, whose compromise by an attacker produces high business impact. A starting parameter in Objective-Based Red Team scenarios, the final address of lateral movement in the Assumed Breach Simulation. “Critical target” is preferred in Turkish copy.
Modular Red Team Simulation (RT-2 / RT-3).
Customer boundary
The authorization boundary separating one customer's data from another's in a multi-tenant application. Authentication does not establish this boundary on its own; it has to be checked at every object access.
Defensible assurance
A form of assurance that is portable under third-party or audit pressure, audit-ready and resting on an evidence-based ground. Not claims of “total assurance” or “100% security”; it works on two distinct lines - portable (S4-A) and audit-ready (S4-B). It is a fixed part of the Red in Pulse category line.
Deployment pipeline
The path of taking the model from the registry to the deployment environment; recording in a verifiable way the trust chain of staging-versus-production, multi-tenant, multi-region or shared-platform topology. It is the last link of the model trust chain.
Detect-and-report reflex
An employee’s reflex to notice a social-engineering attempt and report it to the organization. It is the primary evidence object of the Social Engineering Simulation. Click rate is context data; the reporting reflex is the decision object. It is measured alongside time-to-report and correct-escalation percentage.
“who got fooled?” language - the Red in Pulse Social Engineering Simulation does not use a shaming frame.
Detection gap
A MITRE ATT&CK-aligned, measurable control-visibility matrix for the SOC and Blue Team, showing where attack-path steps are seen and missed by the defense. Not a list of individual missing detection rules; it is structured evidence of defensive visibility along the attack path.
Device code flow (Device Authorization Grant)
An OAuth 2.0 flow (RFC 8628) designed for devices with limited keyboard or browser interaction, where the user approves a code on a separate device. It carries no attacker-owned link, so the do-not-click reflex never engages.
Dual-Layer delivery
Reporting delivered together as two distinct layers: a decision-support summary for management (risk picture, priority rationale, closure visibility) and an owned, ordered, fix-first work list for the technical team. Not an executive report alone; the two layers are visible together.
Dwell time
The time between an attacker entering the environment and being noticed. It is the most honest measure of detection capability, and it is understood by measuring it in a real scenario rather than by counting deployed products.
Effective permissions
The gap between an identity's declared permissions and the real access that remains after policies, boundaries and conditions intersect. In cloud environments what an identity can reach is found by computing that intersection, not by reading the policy attached to it.
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System)
A probability-based scoring system that estimates how likely a vulnerability is to be exploited in the wild in the near term. Used alongside CVSS, which measures technical severity, it brings the priority order closer to real risk.
Escalation
Starting an information flow through a predefined channel to named owners when planned scope is exceeded during testing, an unexpected critical finding is encountered, or operational-impact risk arises. It is kept in writing within the Rules of Engagement (RoE) and is an inseparable part of controlled execution.
Evaluation set (eval set)
A structured set of test scenarios, verifiable metrics and acceptance gates designed to test an AI-assisted workflow against acceptance criteria for accuracy, security and delivery quality. Without it, a proof of concept or controlled pilot is not accepted.
AI for Pentest & Red Team.
Evidence-based validation
A validation approach derived not from a scan or audit checklist but from real technical or operational observation, measurement, chain or control effect. Without this ground, nothing is called “validated”. It is a fixed part of the Red in Pulse category line.
Fix-first backlog
An ordered, owned, actionable remediation work list by business impact and risk level. It is the primary evidence object of the Application Security Penetration Test. Not a to-do list; a prioritized work decision derived from proven technical reality, ready to enter the product team’s sprint queue directly. Turkish equivalent: prioritized remediation work list.
Application Security Penetration Test.
GenAI Red Team
Testing the runtime chain of generative-AI applications (prompt, tool, data, authority, MCP) through a validated abuse path. It is not the AI variant of a traditional penetration test; it looks not at what the agent knows but at what it can do. Generative AI Red Team is its canonical name.
Model Supply-Chain Assurance (the model’s origin) and AI for Pentest (the internal workflow). The three are different services.
Host-only cookie and the __Host- prefix
A cookie with no Domain attribute is sent only to its own host. The __Host- prefix forbids Domain outright and requires Secure with a root Path; this is the control that actually holds against sibling subdomains in the field.
Human in the loop
Binding an automated flow to a human decision before it takes a consequential step. In AI-assisted offensive workflows it is the mandatory gate standing in front of every step that touches the target.
IAM
Identity and Access Management. The control domain for the question of who can access what, under which conditions, on cloud providers. AWS IAM roles and policies, Azure Entra ID and GCP service accounts are established forms of this domain. An established English acronym; preserved in Turkish copy.
Indirect prompt injection
An instruction planted in third-party content the model reads (a document, web page, email or knowledge-base record) being processed as though it were the user's request. The attacker never talks to the model; they write to a source the model trusts.
KVKK
Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data. The core legislation regulating the processing of personal data in Türkiye. Its Article 3 definitions (data controller, data subject, explicit consent, personal data) and Article 10 disclosure obligation form the ground for both the privacy notice and assurance-line design.
Lateral movement
The attacker advancing from the first position reached toward the critical target through side steps on the network or identity plane. The Assumed Breach Simulation (RT-3) aims to prove this chain. “Yatay geçiş” is preferred in Turkish copy; “lateral movement” may appear in parentheses as the established technical form.
Lateral movement (Turkish)
The Turkish equivalent of the attacker advancing through side steps from the first position reached toward the critical target. Also referred to by the established technical form “lateral movement”. It is the backbone of Assumed Breach Simulation reporting.
Lethal trifecta
The condition where an AI system simultaneously reaches private data, reads untrusted content, and can communicate outward. With all three present, indirect prompt injection can become data exfiltration; removing any one of them breaks the chain.
Management visibility
Decision-support offensive-assurance visibility for management through a monthly executive summary, quarterly risk trend, closure rate and the next month’s priority area. It is the management leg of Continuous Penetration Testing; not an “executive report” alone, but the programmatic form of two-layer delivery.
MCP (Model Context Protocol)
An open protocol for establishing a standard, two-way connection between AI models and external tools, data sources and systems. In the Generative AI Red Team scope, the MCP chain (authorization, user consent, token management, session control, tool exposure) is a separate abuse surface.
Microsegmentation
An approach that brings network isolation down to the host, workload or application level, defining narrow neighborhoods instead of broad zones. It shrinks the area lateral movement can reach, though whether the policy is genuinely enforced is established by controlled testing.
MITRE ATLAS
A classification of attack tactics and techniques against AI systems; the extension of MITRE ATT&CK logic to AI. It is used in Generative AI Red Team reporting to frame abuse-path steps.
MITRE ATT&CK
The industry’s established knowledge base classifying attacker behavior at the tactic and technique level. In Modular Red Team Simulation reports, attack-path steps and the detection-gap matrix are presented aligned with this framework. It is a common language for the SOC and Blue Team.
ML-BOM (AI-ML-BOM)
A component list for AI and machine-learning systems. The extension of the traditional SBOM to cover model artefacts, datasets and training dependencies. The CycloneDX standard defines a structured record form for ML components.
Model supply chain
An evidence-based assessment of the trustworthiness of the model and the release pipeline across the data, pipeline, registry and deployment chain. It is the backbone concept of AI Model Supply-Chain Assurance. It is not confused with the runtime chain (Generative AI Red Team).
MTTR (mean time to remediate)
The average time from a finding being reported to its closure being verified. More than the count of findings, this duration shows the real effect of security work on the business.
Non-human identity (NHI)
Identities with no person behind them: service accounts, application registrations, workload identities and automation keys. They outnumber human identities, fall outside multi-factor authentication, and their lifecycle management is usually incomplete.
Observability
Recording every step of an AI-assisted workflow with logging, audit trail, telemetry and rollback criteria; making the work open to human oversight and evidence-based traceability. It is not monitoring alone; the paired structure of logging, audit trail, telemetry and rollback is preserved.
Offensive security
A category of security practice that aims to produce defensible assurance by moving from the attacker’s side. Not “hacking” or “cyber attack”; an offensive discipline with defined scope, rules and evidence object. The Red in Pulse category identity rests on this ground.
OWASP ASVS
OWASP Application Security Verification Standard - the web application security verification standard. It layers security control requirements across categories V1–V14. Application Security Penetration Test reports can be presented aligned with ASVS categories; it is used for control mapping in the audit-ready evidence package.
OWASP LLM Top 10
A list of the ten most critical security risks in generative-AI applications. It includes headings such as direct and indirect prompt injection, sensitive-information disclosure, supply-chain weakness and excessive agent autonomy. It is the framework reference of Generative AI Red Team reporting.
OWASP MASVS / MASTG
The Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) and the Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG). The control-requirement and test-methodology framework for mobile application validation. It is the ground reference in the mobile scope of the Application Security Penetration Test.
Penetration test
An offensive test run under controlled execution to produce validated technical evidence. Four scopes in the Red in Pulse portfolio: Application Security (PT-1), Network Security (PT-2), Cloud Security (PT-3) and Continuous (PT-5). The PT- code is not used as a heading without explanation; each scope carries a distinct evidence object.
PoC (safe proof of concept)
A reproducible proof of concept that shows a finding is genuinely exploitable, without destructive side effects, preserving data integrity in production. It is designed so the remediation team can validate the finding in its own environment. It is not an “exploit demonstration” carrying attack romanticism.
Primary evidence object
Each service’s real validation product; the decision-closing form of what the ecosystem calls a “finding”. A fix-first backlog in the Application Security Penetration Test, rhythm and measurable closure in the Continuous Penetration Test, a validated attack path in the Modular Red Team Simulation, an abuse path in the Generative AI Red Team. Not a raw finding list, but the evidence that moves the decision.
Privilege chain
A set of authority relationships in cloud identity and permission models that look harmless individually but together lead to privilege escalation. AWS IAM roles, Azure Entra ID subscription-level permissions and GCP service-account transitive permissions are typical addresses of this chain. It is not read from a configuration list; it is proven by manual validation and a safe proof of concept.
Cloud Security Penetration Test.
Privilege escalation
Moving the authority held by the current identity to a higher level along a path it was not designed for. A single permission can look harmless on its own and still be the link in a chain that reaches a critical target.
Prompt injection
Input that changes a generative-AI model’s behavior unexpectedly. The direct form comes from the user prompt; the indirect form is triggered when content from external sources (a web page, file, RAG document) is interpreted by the model. It ranks first in the OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM01).
Provenance (source origin)
Recording in a verifiable way where, how and from which source every component comes across the model artefact, dataset, code, dependencies, build/CI and deployment chain. Not a single “where did the model come from?” question; a provenance chain for the whole of data, dependencies, build, registry and deployment.
AI Model Supply-Chain Assurance.
RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation)
An architecture that enriches context by pulling fragments from external documents or data sources while the model generates a response. It is among the central components of the runtime chain in generative-AI applications; it opens a separate attack surface for disclosure, indirect prompt injection and data-boundary abuse.
RBAC (Role-Based Access Control)
An authorization model that governs which operations user and service identities may perform on which resources, through roles and bindings. The existence of a role is not by itself evidence of a control; the effective outcome has to be verified separately.
Red Team (Modular Red Team Simulation)
A modular offensive simulation that, along the threat-actor, critical-asset or assumed-breach axis and under controlled execution, proves a validated attack path to the critical target. Four modules: Threat-Actor Simulation (RT-1), Objective-Based Red Team (RT-2), Assumed Breach Simulation (RT-3), Human-Layer Initial-Access Package (RT-4A). It is not the scenario version of the Network Security Penetration Test.
The Social Engineering Simulation (PT-4) measures reporting reflex; RT-4A is the human-layer initial-access module. They are not the same.
Refresh token
A long-lived credential used to obtain a new access token when the current one expires. Once stolen it amounts to durable access, and a password change alone does not invalidate it.
Registrable domain (eTLD+1)
The registrable name one label above a Public Suffix List suffix. SameSite and Site Isolation operate on this unit, and cookie scoping derives from it.
Registry
The central system for managing model artefacts, versions and deployment. It is assessed under access control, the promote/rollback flow, audit logging and abuse scenarios. It sits at the center of the model trust chain; it is not a simple model-file store.
Reporting rate
The share of employees who notice a suspicious message in a social engineering simulation and report it. Unlike the click rate, it measures the defense's ability to be told.
Revalidation (re-test)
A controlled second validation that makes the closure of a fix measurable. The proven form of a “fixed” claim; the second leg of the fix-verify cycle. It is the central step of the monthly rhythm in Continuous Penetration Testing; it is also used in the Application Security Penetration Test to measure closure at the end of the project.
RoE (Rules of Engagement)
Rules of Engagement - the document that defines in writing the test’s authority scope, permitted and prohibited actions, the test window, approval gates, the escalation channel and the side-effect control frame. It is the documentary ground of controlled execution; it works as the technical annex to the contract.
Runtime chain
The real-time behavior chain of a generative-AI application across prompt, tool, data (RAG), Model Context Protocol connection, authority and action surfaces. It is the backbone of the Generative AI Red Team scope. It is not confused with the model trust chain (supply chain); one is runtime, the other is the source-and-evidence chain.
model supply chain - one is runtime (AIS-1), the other is the source-and-evidence chain (AIS-2).
SLSA
Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts - a framework of increasing trust levels for the software supply chain. It defines, in layers, the build pipeline’s provenance generation, source awareness and hardened-process requirements. It is the ground reference in AI Model Supply-Chain Assurance reporting.
Social Engineering Simulation
A human-layer program assessment: reporting reflex, time-to-report, correct-escalation percentage and process friction are reduced to an evidence package. Not “who got fooled?”; it opens the question “does it raise the alarm, or does it let them in?”. A non-blaming, measurement-focused frame. It is the canonical name of PT-4.
Third-party trust pressure
The continuous burden of providing evidence created by the security posture assessments an organization undergoes from its customers, business partners or regulator. It is the trigger of the portable-assurance line (S4-A); it is not confused with audit/regulation pressure (S4-B).
Time to report
The time between a simulation message arriving and the first report coming in. It indicates how many minutes into a real incident the defense could begin to act.
Transitive privilege
The rights an identity reaches indirectly through its ability to assume another identity. Examined one by one no identity looks over-privileged, yet following the assumption chain can reveal far broader effective permissions.
Verifiable closure
The proven form of a “fixed” claim, demonstrated by re-measurement, revalidation or control-effectiveness tracking. Not a single “patch applied” note; it is making closure visible within the fix-verify cycle. It is the backbone of rhythm-based closure visibility in the Continuous Penetration Test.
Vishing (voice social engineering)
A form of social engineering carried out over the phone or a voice channel, usually targeting help desk and identity verification processes. It does not exercise the reflex email simulations measure, so it has to be tested separately.
Go deeper
Service Portfolio
For each of the nine services, it presents the decision question, the evidence object, and the scope architecture together.
Go to the portfolio Decision treeService Selection Decision Tree
It helps you work out, step by step, which service is the right first move in which situation.
Open the decision tree ComplianceCompliance Mapping Matrix
It shows, in one place, how service scopes map to KVKK, ISO 27001, NIST CSF, and OWASP ASVS.
Open the matrix Vendor FAQCustomer Security Review FAQ
A vendor question repository providing an Evidence-Based response framework for the SIG, CAIQ, and VSAQ categories.
Go to the FAQ// TERMINOLOGY
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